25 marquee operators · 21 countries · verified roster
Bayer · Pfizer · TATA · Adani · JSW · ISRO · Siemens · Bosch · DuPont · Mahindra · Hindalco · and others
Node-by-node guideword deviation review to IEC 61882 · chaired independently, recorded to closure.
A HAZOP is a structured interrogation of a process against its design intent. We divide the system into nodes, apply guidewords to each process parameter, and work through what happens when the parameter departs from intent · who causes it, what it leads to, what already protects against it, and what is still missing.
Because the P&IDs are wrong. A HAZOP is only as good as the drawing on the table, and in a brownfield plant that drawing has usually drifted from the field through years of tie-ins, relief modifications and instrument changes that never came back to the drawing office. A workshop conducted against a stale P&ID identifies deviations for a plant that no longer exists, and misses the ones created by the changes nobody drew.
The second failure is procedural knowledge. A guideword-driven review of a distillation column asks what happens on low reflux flow, and the answer depends entirely on how the operators actually run the column, what the alarm response procedure says, and what the SIS is configured to do. A chair who has not read the operating procedures before the workshop cannot challenge a comfortable answer from the room.
The third is closure. A study that raises 87 recommendations and files them has moved risk onto paper, not out of the plant. The register with named owners and dates is the deliverable that matters, not the report.
Independent CEng MIE India-qualified chair · IEC 61882 methodology · recommendations tracked to closure. Routes to the Risk + Safety practice lead within 24 hours.
Drawings walked against the field and marked up where they have drifted. The system is then divided into nodes with a stated design intent for each · a node without a design intent cannot be reviewed, because there is nothing for a deviation to depart from.
The chair reads the operating procedures, the alarm rationalisation, the SIS philosophy, the relief study and the MOC history before the room convenes. Previous HAZOP recommendations and their closure status are reviewed so the study builds on the last one rather than repeating it.
Each node is worked parameter by parameter · flow, pressure, temperature, level, composition, and where relevant reaction, with guidewords no, more, less, reverse, as well as, part of and other than applied to each. Causes, consequences, existing safeguards and recommendations are recorded live so the team validates the entry in the room.
Each deviation is ranked against your corporate risk matrix. Where existing safeguards are judged insufficient, the scenario is passed to LOPA for quantified evaluation and, if the gap persists, to SIL determination for sizing of an instrumented function. HAZOP identifies; LOPA and SIL quantify.
An IEC 61882-compliant worksheet set and report, signed by a Chartered Engineer. The recommendation register carries a named owner and a target date per item, and is issued in a form your action tracking system can ingest. Closure tracking is available as a retained service.
Studies are conducted and reported against the process hazard analysis standards your regulator and corporate process safety function cite. Every deliverable independently reviewed and signed by a Chartered Engineer (CEng MIE India).
Three landmark engagements from our verified roster · quantified outcomes, no client names disclosed without written permission.
Five-year revalidation across crude and vacuum distillation with an accumulated MOC backlog folded into scope. 184 nodes revalidated, 87 recommendations raised of which 12 were ranked high severity, and 12 scenarios escalated to LOPA. The register closed inside 18 months.
A steam reformer retrofit triggered a partial re-HAZOP rather than a full revalidation. New deviation cases including tube rupture were added to the existing baseline, keeping the study current without re-running nodes the modification did not touch.
Cleanroom and utility systems reviewed in a single workshop producing two deliverables · a PSM-compliant process hazard analysis and a GMP risk assessment, avoiding a duplicated workshop for the same systems.
Tell us your plant, region, and scope · a named Chartered Engineer responds within 24 hours.